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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we use data from the Mexico and U.S. population censuses to examine who
migrates from Mexico to the United States and how the skills and economic performance of these
individuals compare to those who remain in Mexico. We test Borjas’ negative-selection hypothesis
that in poor countries the individuals with the strongest incentive to migrate to rich countries are
those with relatively low skill levels.  We find that 1) Mexican immigrants, while much less
educated than U.S. natives, are on average more educated than residents of Mexico, and 2) were
Mexican immigrants in the United States to be paid according to current skill prices in Mexico they
would tend to occupy the middle and upper portions of Mexico’s wage distribution.  These results
are inconsistent with the negative-selection hypothesis and suggest, instead, that in terms of
observable skills there is intermediate or positive selection of immigrants from Mexico.  The results
also suggest that migration abroad may raise wage inequality in Mexico.
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  During the last three decades, the United States has experienced rising levels of 
immigration from poor countries.
1  This has made the U.S. labor force larger, younger, 
and less-educated than it otherwise would have been (Smith and Edmonston, 1997; 
Borjas, 1999).  The shift in the composition of immigrants appears to be due in part to 
changes in U.S. policy embodied in the 1965 Immigration Act, which relaxed long-
standing country-of-origin restrictions on immigrant admissions.   
More open immigration policies have allowed a wider cross-section of individuals 
to move to the United States.  In an important strand of literature, Borjas (1987) argues 
that who migrates to the United States from a particular country will depend on that 
country’s wage distribution.  In poor countries, where the returns to education and the 
dispersion of wages are thought to be relatively high, there will be a “negative selection” 
of immigrants.  Those with the greatest incentive to migrate to the United States will tend 
to be individuals with below-average skill levels in their home countries.  In other rich 
countries, where returns to education and wage dispersion are thought to be relatively 
low, there will be “positive selection” of immigrants.  Those with the greatest incentive to 
migrate will tend to be individuals with above-average skill.  In support of this selection 
hypothesis, Borjas (1987, 1995) finds that as sources for U.S. immigration have shifted to 
poor countries, the economic performance of new immigrants has deteriorated.  Relative 
to earlier cohorts, recent immigrants earn lower wages compared to natives at time of 
arrival and take longer for their earnings to converge to native levels.
2  These findings 
                                                 
1 Europe has also had rising immigration from poor countries.  See Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002). 
2 Identifying changes in the average quality of immigrant cohorts is complicated by a confluence of shocks.  
Over time, unobserved cohort quality may change, immigrants may through assimilation improve their 
economic performance relative to natives, and labor-market disturbances may have non-uniform effects on   2
counter an earlier belief that, irrespective of the country of origin, immigrants tend to be 
individuals with high potential for earnings growth (Chiswick, 1978).
3 
  In another strand of literature, there have been attempts to link recent changes in 
the level and composition of immigration to rising U.S. wage inequality.  Many studies 
have found that across U.S. regions immigration inflows are only weakly negatively 
correlated with wage changes for low-skilled U.S. natives, suggesting that immigration 
has had little impact on the U.S. wage structure (LaLonde and Topel, 1997; Smith and 
Edmonston, 1997; Borjas, 1999).  Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) argue that cross-area 
wage regressions of this type identify the wage impact of immigration only under 
restrictive assumptions.  Using factor-content calculations, they find larger effects of 
immigration on the wages of very low-skilled U.S. natives, but this approach too has 
been criticized (Deardorff, 2000; Leamer, 2000).  While the prior of many observers is 
that U.S. immigration has raised wage inequality, the evidence remains in dispute. 
  Largely missing in the discussion of the causes and consequences of U.S. 
immigration is evidence from source countries.  Does evidence on who migrates from 
poor countries to the United States support the negative-selection hypothesis?  Has this 
migration tended to narrow or widen the distribution of wages in source countries?   
In this paper, we use data from the 1990 Mexico population census and data on 
Mexican immigrants in the 1990 U.S. population census  to examine who in Mexico 
migrates to the United States and how their observable skills and wages compare to those 
                                                                                                                                                 
individuals at different points in the wage distribution.  See LaLonde and Topel (1992, 1997), Borjas 
(1999) and Butcher and DiNardo (2002) for differing approaches in how to deal with this issue. 
3 Chiswick (1978) finds that immigrant wages tend to converge to and surpass native wages relatively 
quickly, but Borjas (1987, 1999) criticizes this use of cross-section data to ask time-series questions.  There 
is other evidence of positive selection of migrants in the form of brain drain from poor countries (Beine et 
al., 2001; Carrington and Detragiache, 1998) and the internal migration patterns of more and less skilled 
workers (Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo, 1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000).   3
who remain at home.  Mexico is the largest source country for U.S. immigrants.  During 
the 1990’s, the country accounted for 31.3% of U.S. immigration.  By 2000 the 7.9 
million Mexican immigrants in the United States accounted for 27.7% of the U.S. 
foreign-born population and were equal to 7.8% of Mexico’s total population.  Relative 
to the United States, Mexico has high returns to education and high wage dispersion, 
making it an ideal candidate in which to look for negative selection of migrants. 
There is descriptive literature on Mexican immigrants in the United States that 
tends to support negative selection.  Much of this work is based on surveys at the U.S.-
Mexico border or in Mexican villages that send farm laborers to the United States 
(Massey et al., 1994).  Durand et al. (2001), for instance, find that migrants going to the 
United States have low education levels relative to the average Mexican resident.  These 
survey data, however, are subject to two types of sample selection:  the surveyed 
communities tend to be in rural Mexico, where average schooling is low, and the 
surveyed migrants are those who have chosen to return to Mexico from abroad.
4  Little 
work has used nationally representative samples of Mexican residents and emigrants.
5  
  To preview our results, we have three sets of findings.  First, Mexican 
immigrants, while much less educated than U.S. natives, are on average more educated 
than residents of Mexico.  Mexican individuals with 12 to 15 years of schooling are the 
                                                 
4 Durand et al. (2001) find that the characteristics of Mexican immigrants in the United States have been 
stable over time.  Using alternative survey data, Cornelius and Marselli (2001) find instead that over time 
Mexican immigrants have become younger, more likely to be female, more educated, more urban, and 
more likely to settle in the United States on a permanent basis.  The contrast in results from different 
surveys suggests that sample selection issues are important in the analysis of Mexican immigration. 
5 One exception is Feliciano (2001), who summarizes average schooling levels for Mexican residents and 
Mexican immigrants in the United States over the last several decades.  She finds that in years prior to 
1990, as well, average years of schooling were higher for Mexican immigrants than for Mexican residents. 
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education group most over-represented in the United States.  This is initial evidence 
against the negative-selection hypothesis for Mexico-to-U.S. migration. 
Second, wage differences between the United States and Mexico are decreasing in 
the age and education of the individual.  That U.S.-Mexico wage differentials decrease in 
education and the probability of Mexico-to-U.S. migration increases with education (over 
a range of values) suggests that migration costs play a pivotal role in determining who 
migrates.  These costs appear to be lower for the more educated, who may be better able 
to manage the U.S. immigration process or may be less subject to credit constraints. 
Third, under existing patterns of wage setting, Mexican immigrants would tend to 
fall disproportionately in the middle and upper portions of Mexico’s wage distribution.  
To obtain these results, we extend DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux’s (1996) framework for 
constructing counterfactual wage densities.  We project the wage distribution that would 
obtain were Mexican immigrants in the United States paid according to Mexico’s current 
wage structure (adjusting for a possible U.S. undercount of illegal immigrants).  Our 
findings show evidence against negative selection and suggest instead there is 
intermediate or positive selection of Mexican immigrants in terms of observable skills.  
By removing workers from the middle of Mexico’s wage distribution, Mexico-to-U.S. 
migration may raise wage dispersion in Mexico.  Combined with the Borjas, Freeman, 
and Katz (1997) result that immigration lowers wages for low-skilled U.S. natives, inter-
national migration may raise wage inequality in both sending and receiving countries. 
  The paper has four additional sections.  In section 2, we present a simple model of 
migrant selection.  In section 3, we describe the characteristics and economic 
performance of residents of Mexico and Mexican immigrants in the United States.  In   5
section 4, we use counterfactual wage densities to test for the positive or negative 
selection of migrants from Mexico.  In section 5, we present concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Theory 
  To motivate the empirical analysis, we present a simple model of migration.   
Borjas (1987, 1991) uses the Roy (1951) model to show that in poor countries migrants 
tend to be negatively selected (i.e., they are drawn primarily from the lower half of the 
skill distribution in their home country).  This analysis is based on the assumption that 
time-equivalent migration costs are constant across individuals.  In this case, high returns 
to schooling and high wage dispersion in poor countries give individuals with below 
average skills the strongest incentive to migrate abroad.  In this section, we show that if 
migration costs are decreasing in the skill level, migrants from poor countries may be 
either negatively or positively selected in terms of skill, depending on the magnitude of 
migration costs and the shape of the skill distribution. 
Individuals from Mexico, indexed by 0, choose whether or not to migrate to the 
United States, indexed by 1.  For simplicity, we treat this as a one-time decision, though 
the extension to a dynamic setting is straightforward (see Sjaastad, 1962; Borjas, 1991).  
Residents of Mexico face a wage equation given by 
  s w 0 0 0) ln( δ µ + =       ( 1 )  
where  w0 is the wage in Mexico, µ 0 is the base wage in Mexico, s is the level of 
schooling, and δ 0 is the return to schooling in Mexico.  We focus on migrant selection in 
terms of observable skills and, in particular, in terms of schooling.  Implicitly, we 
imagine  s to be a random variable (and that there are random components to wage   6
determination), but for simplicity we leave these features of migration behavior in the 
background.  The appendix adds these details to the analysis.  If the population of 
Mexicans were to migrate to the United States, they would face the wage equation 
  s w 1 1 1) ln( δ µ + =       ( 2 )  
where w1 is the U.S. wage for a migrant from Mexico, µ 1 is the base wage for migrants, 
and δ 1 is the return to schooling for migrants.  Consistent with the fact that Mexico has a 
relatively scarce supply of skill, we assume that δ 0 > δ 1, or that the return to schooling is 
higher in Mexico than in the United States.  
Let C be migration costs and let π=C/w0 be migration costs in time-equivalent 
units (the number of labor hours needed to migrate to the United States).  Combining (1) 
and (2), a resident of Mexico will migrate to the United States if  
   0 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 0 1 0 1 > − − ≈ + − π w w C w w .  (3) 
Borjas (1987, 1999) assumes that π  is constant, implying that all individuals 
require the same number of labor hours in order to migrate to the United States.  This 
assumption simplifies the analysis, but may not be an accurate reflection of reality.  We 
assume that time-equivalent migration costs decrease with schooling, such that 
  s π π δ µ π − = ) l n (       ( 4 )  
Why might this be the case?  First, individuals migrating legally to the United 
States must satisfy many bureaucratic requirements, involving extensive paperwork and 
repeated interactions with U.S. immigration authorities.  More-educated individuals may 
be able to meet these requirements more easily.
6  Second, a large service industry of 
                                                 
6 Over 90% of legal Mexicans immigrants in the United States are admitted under family reunification 
provisions of U.S. immigration law.  U.S. admissions criteria give primary status to immediate relatives of 
U.S. citizens, secondary status to immediate relatives of U.S. legal residents, tertiary status to more distant   7
lawyers and other specialists exists to help migrants manage the U.S. admissions process.  
Given the cost of these services is more or less fixed, the time-equivalent cost of 
migration will be lower for individuals with higher hourly wages.  There is also a large 
service industry oriented towards illegal immigrants (Orrenius, 1999).  To enter the 
United States successfully, an illegal entrant must cross the border, find transport to a 
safe location in the United States, and obtain counterfeit residency documents (or hire a 
smuggler to provide these services).  These costs are also fixed, implying higher-wage 
individuals require fewer effective labor hours to migrate to the United States.  Third, 
credit constraints may raise migration costs for low-income individuals, who are also 
likely to be less educated.  Individuals may have to borrow to cover migration costs.  If 
lower-income individuals face higher borrowing costs, due to a higher expected 
probability of default, they will face higher migration costs.
7  
  Combining (3) and (4), Figure 1 shows ln(w0) and ln(w1)-π, which defines the 
cutoff schooling level that determines who migrates to the United States in the case 
where δ π=0 and  π µ µ µ e 0 1 > − .  Here, time-equivalent migration costs are constant and 
small, which corresponds to the assumptions in Borjas (1987).  He focuses on 
unobservable skills but the analogy to observable skills is straightforward.  In Figure 1, 
there is negative selection of migrants:  individuals with schooling less than s
* migrate 
from Mexico to the United States and individuals with schooling greater than s
* remain in 
Mexico.  Individuals with relatively high levels of schooling are less likely to migrate to 
the United States due to the fact that the return to schooling in higher in Mexico. 
                                                                                                                                                 
relatives of U.S. citizens, etc.  While obtaining legal assistance cannot change an individual’s priority status 
for admissions, it can help an individual clear the queue for legal admission more quickly. 
7 A related possibility is that more-educated individuals may face less uncertainty with regards to the U.S. 
wages they would earn, making them more likely to migrate for any given wage differential.   8
  Figure 2 shows an alternative case in which δ π>0 and  π µ µ µ e 0 1 < − .
8  Here, 
time-equivalent migration costs are decreasing in schooling and are large.  Individuals 
with schooling in the interval (sL, sU) migrate from Mexico to the United States and those 
with schooling outside this interval remain in Mexico.  The selection of migrants in terms 
of observable skills depends on the distribution of schooling in Mexico.  There are three 
possible cases:  (a) negative selection:  if the mass of the schooling distribution is above 
sL, migrants will primarily be individuals with low schooling relative to those who remain 
in Mexico, (b) positive selection:  if the mass of the schooling distribution is below sU, 
migrants will primarily be individuals with relatively high schooling, or (c) intermediate 
selection:  if the schooling distribution has mass both below sL and above sU, migrants 
will primarily be individuals with intermediate schooling.  In case (c), fixed migration 
costs preclude those with low schooling from migrating and high returns to schooling in 
Mexico dissuade those with high schooling from migrating.  Individuals with 
intermediate schooling thus have the strongest incentive to migrate to the United States.  
In the absence of data on the model’s parameters, we cannot a priori determine which 
case is relevant for Mexico.  We leave it to the empirical analysis to resolve the issue. 
  One important caveat is that our analysis addresses observable skills, only.  If the 
correlation between observable skills and unobservable skills is positive and sufficiently 
strong, we expect that our results would apply to migrant selection in terms of 
unobservable skills, as well.  See the appendix for discussion. 
   
                                                 
8 If  π µ µ µ e 0 1 > − (migration costs are small), then even if migration costs are decreasing in schooling 
there is still an unambiguous prediction for the negative selection of migrants.  An additional assumption 
needed to obtain Figure 2 is that  0
s
1 1 e s / ) w (ln δ > δ + δ = ∂ π − ∂ π π δ − µ
π  for small s.   9
3.  Data and Preliminary Evidence 
  To compare economic outcomes of residents of Mexico to those of immigrants 
from Mexico, we need information on worker characteristics in both Mexico and the 
United States.  We use the 1% sample of individuals from the 1990 General Census of 
Population and Housing for Mexico and the 5% PUMS (public use microdata sample) 
from the 1990 Census of Population and Housing for the United States. 
  We are interested in which Mexican individuals choose to migrate to the United 
States and in how these individuals would perform in Mexico relative to the performance 
of non-migrants.  For the sample of Mexican immigrants in the United States, we focus 
on recent immigrants, defined as those who migrated within the last 10 years.  They 
reflect the composition of individuals admitted under current U.S. immigration policy. 
One important measurement issue is whether we have random samples of 
individuals in each country.  In the United States, a large fraction of immigrants from 
Mexico are in the country illegally.  In 1990, out of the 4.3 million Mexican-born 
individuals in the United States recorded in that year’s census, 1.0 million were estimated 
to be illegal immigrants (Costanzo et al., 2001).  Might we be concerned that illegal 
immigrants are under-represented in the U.S. population census?  Costanzo et al. (2001) 
estimate that of the 19.8 million foreign-born individuals enumerated in the 1990 U.S. 
population census, 3.8 million were illegal immigrants.  They further approximate that 
the 1990 census undercounted illegal immigrants by 15-20%.
9  This matters for our 
analysis if the labor-market characteristics of these individuals differ systematically from 
                                                 
9 In 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that of the 31.1 million foreign-born individuals enumerated in 
the census for that year, 7 million were illegal immigrants (Robinson, 2001).  It approximates that the 2000 
census undercounted illegal immigrants by 15%. 
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those of immigrants in the sample.  In section 4, we conduct sensitivity analysis to assess 
the potential impact of an illegal immigrant undercount on our results. 
 
3.1  Summary Data 
We begin the data summary by considering the magnitude of migrant outflows 
from Mexico to the United States.  While the size of the Mexican immigrant population 
in the United States is well documented, the size of this population relative to the 
population of Mexico is perhaps less appreciated.  Table 1 shows Mexican immigrants in 
the United States as a percentage of the population of Mexico by age cohort for males 
and females.  The sample is all individuals 16-65 years of age.  Among males 25-34 years 
old, the 1990 stock of Mexican immigrants in the United States was equivalent to 12.0% 
of that age cohort in Mexico.  For females, this figure is 8.2%.  The size of the Mexican 
immigrant population relative to the population of Mexico is smaller for younger and 
older cohorts.  The within-decade outflows of individuals from Mexico are also large.  
Among males 25-34 years old, the accumulated net outflow of Mexican migrants to the 
United States during the 1980’s was equal to 6.5% of this cohort’s 1990 population in 
Mexico.  For females, this figure is 4.3%.  Again, the magnitude of migrant outflows 
relative to the population of Mexico is smaller for younger and older cohorts.  Overall, 
the accumulated outflows of Mexican migrants appear large enough to have substantial 
labor-market consequences in Mexico.  
  Tables 2a and 2b show means for age, educational attainment, labor-force 
participation, and hourly wages for residents of Mexico, all Mexican immigrants in the 
United States, recent Mexican immigrants in the United States, and, for comparison,   11
other U.S. immigrants and U.S. natives.  We choose education categories that permit 
direct comparisons between U.S. and Mexico census data.
10  These categories correspond 
roughly to modes for high grade of schooling completed in Mexico, which occur at grade 
6 (primary education), grade 9 (secondary education), and grade 12 (preparatory 
education).  Some immigrants arrive in the United States as children and continue their 
schooling.  They may have moved to the United States as a result of decisions made by 
other family members and not by their own choice.  Their level of schooling may reflect 
U.S. educational opportunities and so be endogenous to having migrated.  To focus on 
migrants who attended school in Mexico and who made their own migration decisions, 
we exclude from the migrant sample individuals under age 17 at time of U.S. entry.
11 
Tables 2a and 2b reproduce the familiar facts that when compared to other U.S. 
residents Mexican immigrants in the United States are younger, are much less educated, 
and have much lower hourly wages.
12  In 1990, 72.3% of all Mexican immigrant men and 
68.2% of recent Mexican immigrant men had completed 11 or fewer years of school, 
compared to only 19.0% of U.S. native men.  However, Mexican immigrants, and recent 
immigrants in particular, compare favorably when we examine educational attainment in 
Mexico.  In 1990, 81.0% of male residents of Mexico had 11 or fewer years of schooling.  
                                                 
10 A natural comparison of educational attainment in Mexico and the United States would be the simple 
means of schooling years completed.  Unfortunately, for individuals with less than 9 years of schooling, the 
1990 U.S. Census only reports educational attainment as zero schooling, 1-4 years of schooling, or 5-8 
years of schooling.  Given the large mass of Mexican immigrants in the United States with less than 9 years 
of schooling, it is difficult to calculate the simple mean of schooling for this group. 
11 The results are unaffected by raising the cutoff age to 19 or 21 years, suggesting the Mexican immigrants 
most likely to continue their education in the United States are those that arrive as children.  Adult 
immigrants appear likely to continue their education after arriving in the United States.  Betts and Lofstrom 
(1998) find that school enrollment rates for adult immigrants are higher than for adult U.S. natives.   
However, the same does not appear to hold for immigrants from Mexico (Borjas, 1996; Trejo, 1997). 
12 For Mexico, average hourly wages are calculated as monthly labor income/(4.5*hours worked last week); 
for the United States, average hourly wages are calculated as annual labor income/(weeks worked last 
year*usual hours worked per week). 
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Relative to male residents of Mexico, Mexican immigrant men are less likely to have 11 
or fewer years of education, more likely to have 12-15 years of education, and less likely 
to 16 plus years of education.  A similar pattern holds for women.   
Table 2 gives preliminary evidence against the negative-selection hypothesis.  In 
terms of observable skills, it is the more educated, not the least educated, who are more 
likely to migrate.  One concern is that recent Mexican immigrants may tend to have high 
levels of schooling in part because they are relatively young and educational attainment 
in Mexico has been rising over time.  To control for the effects of age on schooling, 
Table 3 shows average schooling for 25-34 year old Mexican residents and Mexican 
immigrants in the United States.  For this age cohort, which is the largest among Mexican 
immigrants in the United States, we again see that Mexican immigrants have high 
education levels relative to Mexican residents. 
Returning to Tables 2a and 2b, there appear to be differences in labor-force 
participation rates between residents of Mexico and Mexican immigrants in the United 
States.  To examine this issue further, Tables 4a and 4b report the fraction of the 1990 
population of Mexican residents and of recent Mexican immigrants in the United States 
with positive labor earnings by age and schooling cells.  This definition of labor-force 
participation reflects the sample of individuals for which we have wage observations.  
For males 25-55 years of age with more than four years of education, labor-force 
participation rates in the two countries are quite similar.  Participation rates are higher for 
Mexican immigrant males in the youngest cohort (16-24 years), the oldest cohort (55-65 
years), and with little schooling (0-4 years).  To minimize selection issues related to the 
labor-force participation, we focus the analysis on males aged 25-65.   13
  Labor-force participation rates for women, however, differ markedly between 
migrants and non-migrants.  Among women with 11 or fewer years of education, 
immigrants are much more likely to have positive labor earnings.  This could be due to 
more elastic female labor supply, in which case higher wages in the United States would 
induce higher rates of labor-force participation.  Also, women who are more likely to 
work at any wage level may be more likely to self-select into migration.  In either case, 
Mexican immigrant women in the United States who work may differ from the 
subpopulation of these women that would work were they to return to Mexico.
13 
This is a problem for our later empirical analysis.  In constructing counterfactual 
wage densities, we will want to examine a population of Mexican migrants that would be 
likely to participate in the labor force were they to return to Mexico.  The fact that 
participation rates differ considerably between migrants and non-migrants, and that these 
differences are larger for specific age and education groups, may affect the pattern of 
migrant self-selection that we uncover from data on wage-earning individuals and, in 
particular, may bias the results towards finding negative selection.  This potential bias is 
larger in the case of females, for whom we observe large differences in labor-force 
participation rates.  We return to this issue in section 4. 
 
3.2  Returns to Education and Mexico-U.S. Wage Differentials 
  To examine the incentive to migrate, we report evidence on differences in wage 
outcomes for residents of Mexico and Mexican immigrants in the United States.  As an 
initial indication, Figures 3a and 3b show kernel density estimates for the distribution of 
wages from the samples of Mexican immigrants and Mexican residents.  Not 
                                                 
13 See Baker and Benjamin (1997) for further discussion of immigrant male and female labor supply.   14
surprisingly, wages in Mexico are on average much lower and exhibit greater dispersion, 
as compared to wages for Mexican immigrants in the United States. 
To summarize differences in returns to observable skills in the two countries, we 
estimate OLS wage regressions for five samples of individuals:  residents of Mexico, 
recent Mexican immigrants in the United States, all Mexican immigrants in the United 
States, other immigrants in the United States, and U.S. natives.  Tables 5a and 5b report 
the results.  The regressors are dummy variables for seven categories of educational 
attainment, age, age squared, a dummy variable for marital status, a dummy variable for 
residence in a metropolitan area, dummy variables for race, and, for immigrants, dummy 
variables for year of entry into the United States. 
The estimated returns to education for residents of Mexico are substantially 
higher than for Mexican immigrants or other groups in the United States.
14  Completing 
12 years of schooling is associated with an increase in hourly wages of 66.2 log points for 
men in Mexico but only 12.4 to 18.2 log points for Mexican-born men in the United 
States.  A similar pattern holds for women.  The base wage, as shown by the constant 
term, is substantially higher in the United States than in Mexico.  This difference in the 
base wage appears to account for the large wage differences between the two countries.
15  
                                                 
14 The coefficient estimates of these wage regressions may be affected by several factors.  Estimates of the 
returns to schooling may be biased by correlation between unobserved ability and schooling.  Also, the 
self-selection of individuals into the labor force or into migration may introduce further biases.  This is of 
particular concern when comparing migrant and non-migrant wage equations.  In unreported results, we 
attempted to address self-selection related to migration.  We estimated wage regressions for Mexican-born 
individuals in Mexico and in the United States, including as an additional regressor the inverse Mills ratio 
derived from a probit model of the migration decision.  However, we have concerns about these estimates.  
Since we lack an instrument that affects migration but not wages, identification of the coefficient on the 
inverse Mills ratio is achieved only through the non-linear way in which the other regressors enter into the 
inverse Mills ratio and so depends entirely on distributional assumptions.  Despite these concerns, 
correcting for self-selection into migration has little effect on the coefficient estimates. 
15 We exercise caution in interpreting the constant term as it captures differences across countries in mean 
returns to unobserved skills as well as in returns to raw labor.  Given education, age, and age squared are 
included as regressors, the constant term would algebraically correspond to the log wage of an individual   15
Table 5 also confirms previous results that estimated U.S. returns to education are lower 
for recent immigrants and Mexican immigrants relative to other immigrants and for 
immigrants overall relative to U.S. natives (Borjas, 1996 and 1999). 
  Who migrates to the United States from Mexico is determined in part by expected 
wage differences between the two countries.  Using the estimated returns to observed 
characteristics, we calculate the predicted difference in log wages at each age and 
education level.
16  While this is a crude indication of the incentive to migrate, it is useful 
for generating approximate binational wage differences at a point in time.  One issue in 
constructing these differences is whether to adjust predicted wages for differences in the 
cost of living between the two countries.  If migrants move to the United States 
permanently, then we would want to make such an adjustment.  In fact, many migrants 
remit a portion of their earnings to family members in Mexico (Woodruff and Zenteno, 
2002) or return to Mexico for extended visits (Massey et al., 1996).  For these migrants, 
the relevant price level may be that in Mexico, in which case the nominal difference in 
U.S.-Mexico wages is the appropriate one to consider.  In the interest of producing more 
conservative estimates of binational wage differences, we adjust Mexican hourly wages 
to achieve purchasing power parity with the United States, using PPP adjustment factors 
reported in the Penn World Tables.
17 
Figure 4 shows predicted U.S.-Mexico hourly wage differences by age and 
education level.  Wage differences are largest for the young and for the least educated, 
                                                                                                                                                 
with schooling and age equal to zero.  Zero schooling is an appropriate reference point, but zero age is not.  
Using the estimated coefficients, the predicted log wage for a Mexican-born male who is 25 years old and 
has zero schooling is -0.93 if the individual resides in Mexico and 1.50 if the individual is in the United 
States and migrated in the last ten years.  This is a smaller difference in U.S. and Mexico base wages than 
what is implied by the constant terms in Table 5a.  A similar comment applies to results for females. 
16 The regressions we use to calculate predicted wages in the United States and Mexico include a complete 
set of interactions between educational attainment, age, and age squared.   16
but are quite large in absolute value for all groups.  For a 30-year old male, the predicted 
real U.S. wage premium is $4.07 per hour for an individual with 5-8 years of schooling, 
$3.52 for an individual with 12 years of education, and $2.60 for an individual with 16 or 
more years of education.
18  Results for women are similar.  Wage differences fall with 
age in most cases due to the fact that in the United States the returns to age tend to be 
constant across age levels while in Mexico they rise with age. 
That U.S.-Mexico real wage differences appear to be large and positive for all age 
and education levels suggests that migration costs, broadly defined, are what determine 
who migrates to the United States.  If migration costs were a constant fraction of an 
individual’s wage (i.e., constant in time-equivalent units), then we would expect 
migration rates to be highest for the least educated.  But Table 2 shows that this is not the 
case.  Migration rates are highest for Mexican-born individuals with relatively high levels 
of education (12-15 years of schooling).  To reconcile U.S.-Mexico wage differences that 
fall with the level of education with migration rates that rise with the level of education 
(at least up to 15 years of schooling), we need migration costs to be a lower fraction of 
hourly wages for more-educated individuals.  
  In this section, we have seen evidence that Mexican immigrants in the United 
States have high education levels relative to residents of Mexico, that the returns to 
education for Mexican-born individuals are higher in Mexico than in the United States, 
and that projected U.S.-Mexico wage differentials for a Mexican-born individual are 
large for all age-education cohorts and decline with age and schooling.  We turn next to 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 In 1990, Mexico’s PPP adjusted price level was 43.3% of the price level for the United States. 
18 Stated in percentage terms, these wage differences are, or course, larger (114 log points for an individual 
with 9 years of schooling, 83 log points for an individual with 12 years of education, and 55 log points for 
and individual with 16 or more years of education).   17
see what the observed differences in the composition of Mexican immigrants and 
residents of Mexico imply about the distribution of wages for these two groups. 
 
4.  Migration Abroad and the Distribution of Wages in Mexico 
  In this section, we compare wage distributions for residents of Mexico and 
Mexican immigrants in the United States under common skill prices and labor-force 
participation behavior.  This exercise allows us to determine more formally whether there 
is positive or negative selection of immigrants from Mexico.  It also sheds light on how 
migration abroad might impact the distribution of wages in Mexico.  We begin with a 
simple comparison of wages for Mexican residents and wages for Mexican immigrants in 
the United States, using predicted values from OLS wage regressions.  We then estimate 
semi-parametrically the distribution of wages that would obtain for Mexican immigrants 
were their wages set according to skill prices prevailing in Mexico and were they to 
participate in the labor force in a manner similar to Mexican residents.   
  Several important qualifications apply to our results.  The framework we use does 
not address how the distribution of unobserved characteristics might influence the 
distribution of wages.  If, holding age and education constant, Mexican immigrants in the 
United States have low levels of unobserved ability relative to residents of Mexico, then 
our framework will tend to understate the extent of negative selection.  Our framework 
also fails to address how Mexico-to-U.S. migration affects skill prices in either country.  
Such general-equilibrium considerations are beyond the scope of this paper.  In section 5, 
we discuss these and other qualifications in more detail. 
   18
4.1  Preliminary Evidence 
The first exercise involves the following steps:  1) we estimate OLS wage 
regressions for male and female residents of Mexico, 2) we use the estimated coefficients 
to predict wages for wage earners in Mexico and we find the quintiles for this sample, 3) 
we use the estimated coefficients for residents of Mexico to predict the wages that 
Mexican immigrants in the United States would earn in Mexico, given their observed 
characteristics, and 4) we use the predicted wages for Mexican immigrants to calculate 
the fraction of Mexican immigrants that would occupy each of the wage quintiles for 
Mexican residents.  This exercise is a preliminary attempt to determine whether there is 
negative or positive selection of Mexican immigrants.  If Mexican residents and Mexican 
immigrants have the same distribution of observed characteristics, then roughly 20% of 
Mexican immigrants will occupy each of the Mexican-resident wage quintiles.  If, on the 
other hand, Mexican immigrants tend to be negatively selected in terms of observable 
skills, then immigrants will be over-represented in the lower wage quintiles of Mexican 
residents and under-represented in the upper wage quintiles. 
  Table 6 shows how Mexican immigrants in the United States are distributed 
across wage quintiles for residents of Mexico when we predict their wages using OLS 
wage equations for Mexican residents.  We present results for all Mexican immigrants 
and for recent immigrants.  For men, Mexican immigrants are relatively concentrated in 
the third and fourth highest wage quintiles and recent immigrants are relatively 
concentrated in the fourth highest quintile.  Mexican immigrant men, and recent 
immigrants in particular, would appear to fall disproportionately in the upper half of the 
wage distribution for Mexican residents.  This finding goes against the negative-selection   19
hypothesis.  In terms of predicted wages, the relative youth of Mexican immigrant men is 
more than compensated for by their higher education levels. 
For women, Mexican immigrants are concentrated in the two lower wage 
quintiles, which would appear to support the hypothesis that immigrants are negatively 
selected in terms of observable skills.  This is surprising, given the high levels of 
schooling for Mexican immigrant women relative to Mexican resident women in Table 
2b.  What may account for low predicted wages for Mexican immigrant women is that 
women with low schooling are much more likely to work in the United States than in 
Mexico.  The same is not true for men.  This results in female Mexican wage earners in 
the United States being younger and less educated relative to female wage earners in 
Mexico, even though in the total population immigrant women are more educated.   
The results suggest that when projecting wages that Mexican immigrants would 
earn in Mexico, we should control for differences in labor-force participation between the 
two countries.  If, as in Table 6, we make no such adjustment, then we end up with a 
sample of Mexican immigrant workers selected on the basis of who is willing to work at 
U.S. skill prices and a sample of Mexican resident workers selected on the basis of who is 
willing to work at Mexican skill prices.  For the comparison of wage distributions in the 
two countries to be meaningful, individuals should be selected on the basis of a common 
labor-force participation criterion.  We address this issue in the next section. 
 
4.2  Counterfactual Wage Densities 
Wage distributions for Mexican immigrants in the United States and for residents 
of Mexico may differ because of differences in the distribution of skills between the two   20
groups or because of differences in the prices of skills in the two labor markets.  To 
examine differences in the distribution of skills between Mexican residents and Mexican 
immigrants, we compare wage distributions for Mexican migrants and Mexican residents 
under a common set of skill prices.  We compute the counterfactual wage density of 
Mexican immigrants in the United States, assuming they are paid according to Mexico’s 
wage structure, and compare it to the actual distribution of wages in Mexico.  This 
involves applying techniques developed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996).  In 
practice, their technique requires taking Mexico’s actual wage distribution and re-
weighting it according to the observed characteristics of immigrant workers. 
The analysis in section 4.1 suggests that the distribution of skills may differ in 
part between Mexican immigrant workers and Mexican resident workers because 
different skill prices in the two countries create different patterns of labor-force 
participation.  To compare wage distributions in the two countries, it is necessary to hold 
constant both skill prices and how skill prices influence labor-force participation.  To do 
so, we extend the techniques in DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux.  We begin with Mexico’s 
actual wage density, which corresponds to Mexico’s wage structure integrated over the 
distribution of resident-worker characteristics. Then, we re-weight this distribution 
according to the observed characteristics of all Mexican immigrants (and not just those 
who earn positive wages).  This simulates the wage distribution that would prevail given 
immigrant characteristics and Mexican skill prices and labor-force participation rates. 
Let  f 
i(w|x) be the density of wages w in country i, conditional on a set of 
observed characteristics x.  Also, let Di be an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
individual is in the labor force and equal to zero otherwise. We further define   21
h(x|i=Mex,Di=1) as the density of observed characteristics among wage earners in 
Mexico, and h(x|i=US,Di=1) as the density of observed characteristics among wage-
earning Mexican immigrants in the United States.  The observed density of wages for 
individuals working in Mexico is 
∫ = = = = = dx D Mex i x h x w f D Mex i w g i
Mex
i ) 1 , | ( ) | ( ) 1 , | (     (5) 
Likewise, the observed density of wages for Mexicans working in the U.S. is 
∫ = = = = = dx D US i x h x w f D US i w g i
US
i ) 1 , | ( ) | ( ) 1 , | (     (6) 
Differences in  ) | ( x w f
Mex  and  ) | ( x w f
US  capture differences in skill prices in the 
two countries.
19  Differences in h(x|i=Mex,Di=1) and h(x|i=US,Di=1) capture differences 
in the distribution of observed characteristics for Mexican immigrant workers and for 
Mexican resident workers. The differences in the h(·) functions are due in part to 
differences in the characteristics of Mexican immigrants and Mexican residents and in 
part to differences in who participates in the labor force in the two countries. 
Consider the density of wages that would prevail for Mexican immigrant workers 
in the United States if they were paid according to the prices of skills in Mexico: 
∫ = = = dx D US i x h x w f w g i
Mex Mex
US ) 1 , | ( ) | ( ) (     (7) 
This corresponds to the distribution of wages for Mexican residents in (5), except that it 
is integrated over the skill distribution for working Mexican immigrants in the United 
States.  While this distribution is unobserved, we can rewrite it as 
                                                 
19 When the conditional expectation is linear in the observed characteristics, these terms are closely related 
to the regression equation for wages on observable characteristics (Butcher and DiNardo, 2002). 
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The key insight of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) is that a counterfactual 
density as in (7) can be estimated by taking an observed density (e.g., for wage earners in 
Mexico) and re-weighting it (e.g., to reflect the distribution of characteristics of Mexican 
immigrant workers) as in (8).  To compute the weights, use Bayes’ Law to write, 
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=       (11) 
Combining (10) and (11) we can obtain an expression for θ that is a function of the ratio 
of the probability that a Mexican-born individual works in Mexico (conditional on x) to 
the probability that a Mexican-born individual works in the United States (conditional on 
x).  DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) suggest estimating these probabilities 
parametrically, using the estimates to calculate θ, and then applying the estimated θ’s to 
standard kernel density estimators to obtain a counterfactual wage density as in (8). 
But the counterfactual density in (8) is not what we desire, precisely.  The weight, 
θ, as seen in (9), adjusts for differences in the distribution of skills between Mexican 
immigrants and Mexican residents, conditional on Mexican immigrants working in the 
United States and Mexican residents working in Mexico.  In order to compare wage   23
distributions for the two groups, we want to condition on common labor-force 
participation behavior.  This requires modifying the weight we use to construct the 
counterfactual wage density.  First, note that it is possible to write the joint probability of 
migration and labor-force participation, conditional on x, as the product of the conditional 
distribution of the participation outcome and the marginal of the migration outcome: 
) | Pr( ) , | 1 Pr( ) | 1 , Pr( x US i x US i D x D US i i i = = = = = =     (12) 
 ) | Pr( ) , | 1 Pr( ) | 1 , Pr( x Mex i x Mex i D x D Mex i i i = = = = = =    (13) 
Given (9)-(13), we can write: 
) 1 , Pr( ) | Pr( ) , | 1 Pr(
) 1 , Pr( ) | Pr( ) , | 1 Pr(
= = = = =




D US i x Mex i x Mex i D
D Mex i x US i x US i D
θ    (14) 
Next, note that Pr(i = Mex, Di=1)/Pr(i = US, Di=1) is a constant given by the 
sample proportions of Mexican resident and Mexican immigrant workers.  Since θ  is 
scaled to sum to one, we can without loss of generality set Pr(i = Mex, Di=1)/Pr(i = US, 
Di=1) = 1.  Thus, the weight θ can be written as the product of two ratios: 
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x US i M θ    (16) 
The first ratio – the probability of a Mexican-born individual working, conditional on 
being in the United States, over the probability of a Mexican-born individual working, 
conditional on being in Mexico – adjusts Mexico’s wage density in (8) to reflect U.S. 
labor-force participation rates for each realization of x.  The second ratio – the probability 
of a Mexican-born individual being in the United States over the probability of a   24
Mexican-born individual being in Mexico – corrects the wage density of Mexican 
residents to reflect the characteristics of Mexican immigrants. 
  Clearly, the second ratio, θ
M, is the appropriate weight to construct our desired 
counterfactual wage density.  In (15) and (16), we see that the full weight, θ, adjusts for 
differences in observed characteristics between Mexican immigrants and Mexican 
residents and for differences in labor-force participation.  The density we desire should 
adjust only for the former set of differences.  In (8), we replace θ  with θ
M, which yields 
the wage distribution that would obtain if immigrants were paid according to Mexican 
skill prices and participated in the labor force as do residents of Mexico.
20 
To compute θ
M, we estimate Pr(i=US | x) parametrically by running a logit on the 
probability of a Mexican adult being in the United States using the full sample of 
Mexican immigrants and Mexican residents (and not just wage earners).  Once we 
estimate this model, we can compute Pr(i=Mex | x) = 1 - Pr(i=US | x) and construct the 
relevant weight 
M
j θ for each observation j in the sample. 
Having computed these weights (and normalized them to sum to one), we 
estimate the counterfactual wage density non-parametrically.  A kernel density estimator 
applied to the sample of wage earners in Mexico, but using the weights described above, 
would yield an estimate of the desired counterfactual density.  We adapt the Rosenblatt-
Parzen kernel density estimator to the case in which observations have sample weights, 
                                                 
20 For males, θ  and θ
M are close in value (labor-force participation rates among males are similar in the two 
countries, making θ
P close to one).  Using either θ  or θ
M to construct the counterfactual wage densities 
yields similar results.  For females, labor-force participation rates differ in the two countries.  The 
counterfactual wage density for females using θ   as the weight places greater emphasis on the earnings of 
women with low levels of schooling and so is more supportive of negative selection (in contrast to the 
results that we report below using θ
M as the weight).  This finding is qualitatively similar to the results in 
Table 6 and highlights the importance of holding labor-force participation constant. 


















) w ( g ˆ
θ
       ( 1 7 )  
where we use j = 1,…,n sampled workers in Mexico with wages Wj.  In this expression K 
corresponds to a kernel function, and h is the selected bandwidth.   
This methodology detects differences in the wage distributions of Mexican 
residents and Mexican immigrants attributable to differences in observed characteristics.  
If observable characteristics understate differences in the true distribution of skills, then 
the results may underestimate the actual difference in corresponding wage densities.  
 
4.3  Main Results 
We apply the methodology to our combined sample of Mexican residents and 
recent Mexican immigrants in the United States (individuals born in Mexico who are 25-
65 years of age).  To construct counterfactual wage densities, we estimate a logit model 
for Pr(i=US | x), using the full sample of individuals.  The model links the choice of 
migrating to the United States to the age and age squared of the individual, dummy 
variables for schooling and marital status, and interactions of these variables.  In the case 
of females, the model also includes the number of children born to an individual. 
Predicted probabilities for the logit model are shown in Figure 5.
21  T h e  
probability of migrating to the United States is non-monotonic in age and education.  It 
first rises with age, peaking at 25 to 30 years, and then declines.  This is consistent with 
the idea that the young, who would enjoy high relative earnings abroad over more years, 
                                                 
21 The graphs include predicted probabilities using data for individuals with ages from 16 to 65 years of 
age. This is done to produce a more complete picture of how migration probabilities change with age. The 
counterfactuals below are based on logit models using data for individuals 25 to 65 years of age. The 
resulting predicted probabilities do not differ from those shown in the graphs.   26
have the most to gain from migration.  From zero schooling, the migration probability 
declines with education up to nine years of schooling and then rises, peaking for 
individuals with 12 years of schooling, and then declines again.  The high migration 
probability for individuals with zero schooling may reflect the large presence of migrant 
farm workers among Mexican immigrants in the United States.  Farm workers tend to be 
older and are the occupation group most likely to have zero schooling.  The low 
likelihood of the very educated to migrate may be explained by the fact that differences 
in returns to education for Mexican immigrants and residents of Mexico are largest for 
this schooling group.  They appear to have the least to gain from migration. 
Having estimated logit models for males and females and computed the weights, 
θ
M, we use the sample of wage-earning Mexican residents to construct kernel density 
estimates for the hourly wages of individuals residing in Mexico and the counterfactual 
kernel densities for Mexican immigrants in the United States, assuming they are paid 
according to Mexican skill prices and they follow the same labor-force participation 
behavior as Mexican residents.  In these estimates, the choice of bandwidth is determined 
by starting with small values and increasing them gradually until a relatively smooth plot 
of the estimate is achieved.  When comparing densities, the same bandwidth is applied to 
each.  All estimates are based on a Gaussian kernel function.
22 
The results for Mexican males are in Figure 6a.  Although the counterfactual 
density for Mexican immigrants is fairly close to the actual density of Mexican residents, 
                                                 
22 We first used Silverman’s (1986) optimal bandwidth, which minimizes the mean integrated squared error 
if the data are Gaussian and a Gaussian Kernel is used.  However, the resulting densities appeared to be 
excessively smoothed and could in fact suffer from bias if the data do not conform to the Gaussian 
assumption.  In order to avoid large bias in our estimates, we instead started with a bandwidth of 0.03 log 
wage units, and sequentially increased it until the resulting densities looked relatively smooth.  This usually 
implied bandwidths in our final estimates of around 0.07 log wage units.   27
some clear differences are apparent.  Contrary to the negative-selection hypothesis, it is 
not the lowest-wage males who exhibit a disproportionately high tendency to migrate to 
the United States.  Under the negative selection hypothesis, we would expect the 
counterfactual density to exhibit a larger mass in the lower tail and a smaller mass in the 
upper tail, when compared with the actual wage distribution of Mexico residents. In 
contrast, the counterfactual wage density we estimate shows that, for wages up to the 
peak of Mexico’s wage distribution, the counterfactual is very close to the actual 
Mexican wage density.  Moreover, the counterfactual has a larger mass for wage values 
at the peak of the distribution and above.  It is not until high wages are reached that the 
counterfactual density falls below the actual density of resident males.  Thus, the 
counterfactual tends to support an intermediate selection pattern. The negative-selection 
hypothesis appears to explain only the comparative behavior of medium and high-wage 
males.  The latter are more likely to stay in Mexico than the former. 
It appears that the men with the highest likelihood to migrate abroad would have 
medium-to-high wage levels in Mexico and that those least likely to migrate would have 
very high wage levels in Mexico.  Were Mexican immigrant males in the United States to 
return to Mexico and be paid according to Mexico’s current wage structure, they would 
tend to fall disproportionately in the middle and upper half of Mexico’s wage 
distribution.  This suggests that migration abroad, by taking mass away from the middle 
of Mexico’s wage distribution, may raise wage inequality in the country. 
The results for females appear to be even less supportive of negative selection.  In 
Figure 6b, we see that up to the peak of the wage distribution for females in Mexico, the 
counterfactual density for immigrant females is consistently below the actual density for   28
female residents of Mexico. To the right of the peak, the counterfactual density is above 
the actual density for a large range of wage values and practically never falls below the 
actual density of Mexico residents.  Women who migrate from Mexico to the United 
States appear to be positively selected from the wage distribution.  Comparing this with 
the results in Table 6 suggests that the apparent over-representation of immigrant females 
in the lowest wage quintiles in Mexico is a result of the different labor-force participation 
patterns in the two countries and is not indicative of negative selection of female 
immigrants. This comparison makes clear the importance of assuming common labor-
force participation behavior for our exercise. 
Summarizing our results, it appears that, for both men and women, those most 
likely to migrate to the United States are from the middle and upper portions of Mexico’s 
wage distribution. This is inconsistent with negative selection hypothesis. In terms of 
observable skills, males exhibit behavior consistent with intermediate selection and 
females exhibit behavior consistent with positive selection.  
 
4.4  Correcting for the Undercount of Illegal Immigrants  
As discussed in section 3, the U.S. census may undercount illegal immigrants by 
as much as 20%.  This may matter for our results, since the undercounted illegal 
immigrants may have observable characteristics that differ systematically from other 
Mexican immigrants.  One group of illegal immigrants that appear likely to be 
undercounted by the census are undocumented farm workers, who tend to have very low 
education levels.  If there are enough undercounted migrants and they have low enough 
education levels, then our results could be biased against finding negative selection of   29
migrants.  We cannot remedy this problem directly, since we lack data on which 
immigrants are illegal within our sample.  However, we do have data from other sources 
on the characteristics of likely illegal immigrants.  We use these data to examine the 
sensitivity of our results to the potential undercount of illegal immigrants. 
We repeat the exercises from the previous section, but now modify the immigrant 
sample so that the sampling weights for the logit analysis used to construct the 
counterfactuals correspond to those of a synthetic sample in which there is no undercount 
of illegal immigrants.  We re-weight the original sample so that:  i) the new weights 
reflect an increase in the total Mexican immigrant population in the United States, 
corresponding to the estimated number of undercounted illegal immigrants, and ii) the re-
weighting procedure increases the population size to a greater extent for education groups 
in which out-of-sample evidence suggests that illegal immigrants are more concentrated. 
The sample re-weighting procedure draws on data from Costanzo et al. (2001) 
who estimate that, out of the 4.3 million Mexican-born individuals included in the 1990 
U.S. census, around 1 million individuals were illegal immigrants. Thus, if we assume a 
20% undercount rate, the total number of Mexican-born illegal immigrants in the United 
States in 1990 was of around 1.25 million.
23,24  Under this assumption, the census should 
have recorded around 250,000 more Mexican-born individuals, implying an increase of 
around 6% in the Mexican-born population actually recorded. Thus, we re-weight the 
                                                 
23 Costanzo et al. (2001) consider both a low undercount rate of 15% and a high rate of 20%.  We chose the 
high rate to maximize the possible impact undercounted migrants could have on our results.  
24 This figure may seem too low.  Borjas, Freeman and Lang (1991) estimate a total of 1.8 million illegal 
Mexican aliens in 1980.  The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates that in 1996 there 
were 2.7 Mexican illegal immigrants in the United States (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
1998).  However, it is important to recall that more than 2 million undocumented Mexican immigrants were 
legalized under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.  Costanzo et al. (2001) consider this effect 
in computing their estimates for 1990.  Taking legalization into account, other authors have constructed 
estimates of the illegal immigrant population that are similar to the figure above (Fix and Passel, 1994).   30
original sample so that the represented population is increased by this percentage.
25 In 
order to make this increased population have the characteristics of illegal immigrants, we 
adjust the weights by schooling group.  The “new” population is assumed to follow the 
distribution of immigrants by schooling group presented in Orrenius (1999), which is 
reproduced in Table 7. This distribution is based on the “Mexican Migration Project”, a 
household sample conducted in rural communities in the states of Mexico where 
migration to the United States has been traditionally high (see Durand et al., 1996; 
Massey et al., 1994).  A high fraction of the migrants in this sample reported entering the 
United States illegally.  The schooling levels of this group are much lower than those of 
Mexican immigrants counted in the U.S. census or of residents of Mexico.
26 
Figures 7a and 7b show the results of this exercise.  For both males and females, 
we use the methodology described in the previous section, so that the immigrant 
counterfactual assumes the same labor-force participation rates as those of residents of 
Mexico.  The resulting counterfactual density estimates are very similar to those obtained 
without the illegal undercount correction and have the same qualitative implications.  In 
particular, they still reflect the intermediate selection pattern for males and the positive 
selection pattern for females found before. This suggests that census undercounts of 
illegal immigrants do not matter materially for our results.  We would need to assume 
implausibly high undercount rates in order to change qualitatively our main findings. 
                                                 
25 We perform this procedure separately for males and females.  There is an implied increase in the 
population of males by 4.2% and of females by 8.0%. 
26 One drawback of using this distribution is that it corresponds to male heads of household between 15 and 
65 years of age.  In order to adjust the female migrant sample we need to assume the distribution of 
schooling is similar to that for males (in census data, mean schooling for males and females is similar).  
Also, mean schooling for this sample is lower than for other samples with high proportions of illegal 
migrants (Cornelius and Marselli, 2001; Durand, Massey and Zenteno, 2001).  By using this sample, we 
increase the potential effect of the exercise on our results.   31
Other results based on samples in which illegal immigrants are over-represented 
tend to support our findings.  Orrenius and Zavodny (2001) use survey data on rural, low-
skilled illegal migrants in Mexico and find that among this group migrants tend to come 
from the middle of the schooling distribution.  The least educated tend not to migrate to 
the United States.  They also show that a worsening of economic conditions in Mexico 
tends to increase the skill levels of immigrants, perhaps due to credit constraints 
becoming more severe for less skilled individuals during downturns. 
 
4.5  Robustness Checks 
  We have argued that it is important to hold constant how skill prices affect labor-
force participation when comparing wage distributions across workers in different 
countries.  So far, we have used skill prices and labor-force participation in Mexico as the 
basis for these comparisons.  This is a natural choice, in that we are interested in the 
potential effects of migration abroad on Mexican wages.   For purposes of evaluating 
whether immigrants are negatively or positively selected, it is no less valid to use labor-
force participation in the United States as the basis for comparison.  As a consistency 
check on our previous results, we estimate the distribution of wages that would obtain if 
residents of Mexico were paid according to U.S. skill prices and participated in the labor 
force as do Mexican immigrants and then compare this to the actual wage distribution for 
Mexican immigrants.  If immigrants from Mexico are negatively selected in terms of 
observable skills, then we would expect the counterfactual wage density for Mexican 
residents to be right shifted relative to the actual density for Mexican immigrants.   32
  Following the analysis in section 4.2, the counterfactual wage density we wish to 
estimate is the wage structure for Mexican immigrants in the United States integrated 
over characteristics of Mexican residents, or 
    dx ) 1 D , US i | x ( h ) x | w ( f
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where the appropriate weight is the inverse of θ
M, the weight defined in equation (16).  
This inverse is the probability of a Mexican-born individual being in Mexico over the 
probability of a Mexican-born individual being in the United States, where both 
probabilities are conditional on x.  Thus, we can obtain the desired counterfactual wage 
density by taking the actual wage density of Mexican immigrants in the United States and 
re-weighting it by the characteristics of all Mexican residents.  To estimate this density, 
we perform the same steps described earlier, which entails estimating a logit for the 
probability that a Mexican-born individual is in the United States, using the logit results 
to estimate the weight 1/θ
M, and then applying the weights to estimate non-parametrically 
a kernel density for Mexican immigrant wages. 
  Figures 8a and 8b report the results.  For neither males nor females is there 
support for the hypothesis that Mexican immigrants are negatively selection in terms of 
observable skills.  For males, the results mirror those in Figure 6a.  The actual wage 
density for immigrants is similar to the counterfactual density for residents.  The 
differences that do appear are in the upper half of the wage densities.  Compared to the 
actual density for immigrants, the counterfactual density for resident males shows less 
mass in the region just to the right of the peak and more mass in the upper tail.  Resident 
males appear to be slightly under-represented in the upper middle portion of the 
immigrant wage distribution and slightly over-represented in the upper tail.  This is   33
consistent with modest intermediate selection of male immigrants in terms of observable 
skills.  Differences in the actual and counterfactual wage densities in Figure 8a are 
smaller than those in Figure 6a in part because U.S. returns to education are lower than 
those in Mexico.  This compresses any differences in wage distributions between 
immigrants and residents that are due to differences in educational attainment.  For 
women, Figure 8b mirrors Figure 6b, with differences in the actual and counterfactual 
wage densities also being less pronounced.  Compared to the actual wage density for 
immigrants, the counterfactual density for resident females shows more mass to the left 
of the peak of the distribution and less mass to the right of the peak.  This is consistent 
with modest positive selection of immigrant females in terms of observable skills. 
 
5.  Discussion 
In this paper, we combine two representative samples of Mexican-born 
individuals, one of residents of Mexico and another of immigrants in the United States.  
We use these data to test Borjas’ (1987) negative-selection hypothesis that in poor 
countries the less-skilled are those most likely to migrate to rich countries. 
Our results are inconsistent with the negative selection of Mexican immigrants in 
the United States.  For Mexican-born males, there is evidence of intermediate selection 
and for Mexican-born females there is evidence of positive selection.  Those most likely 
to migrate are young adults with moderately high levels of schooling.  Were these 
immigrants to return to Mexico, they would tend to fall disproportionately in the middle 
or upper portions of Mexico’s wage distribution.  This suggests that migration to the   34
United States may reduce the relative supply of middle and upper-middle wage earners in 
Mexico, contributing to a widening of earnings inequality in the country.   
To arrive at these results, we construct counterfactual wage densities for Mexican 
immigrants in the United States, in which we use their observed characteristics to project 
the wages they would earn were they to return to Mexico and be paid according to current 
patterns of wage determination in the country.  These counterfactuals assume that the 
labor-force participation of immigrants mimics that of residents of Mexico.  The results 
appear robust to a possible undercount of illegal immigrants in the U.S. census. 
There are several important caveats to our results.  First, we cannot say how the 
return of Mexican immigrants in the United States would affect Mexico’s wage structure.  
This is a complicated general-equilibrium question that we do not address.  We construct 
counterfactual wage densities to test Borjas’ selection hypothesis for Mexico and to 
gauge from where in Mexico’s wage distribution migrants bound for the United States 
are most likely to be drawn.  Second, our findings against negative selection and in favor 
of intermediate or positive selection are in terms of observable characteristics only.  We 
cannot say whether the unobserved skills of Mexican immigrants in the United States are 
high or low relative to those who remain in Mexico.  Still, it is natural to expect that 
education is positively correlated with individual ability.  In this case, accounting for 
unobserved skill would be unlikely to change our results drastically. 
That immigrants from Mexico appear to be relatively high-wage individuals is 
surprising.  Projected U.S.-Mexico wage differentials are largest for the least educated, 
suggesting that it is low-wage individuals from Mexico who would have most to gain 
from migrating to the United States.  We appeal to heterogeneity in migration costs as a   35
way to reconcile migration probabilities that rise with education (at least over a range of 
schooling levels) with binational wage differentials that fall with education.   
The more educated may be better able to negotiate the process of migrating 
abroad, they may have better access to migration networks that would help them get 
established in the United States, or they may be less subject to credit constraints in 
financing migration.  It may also be the case that higher discount rates or greater risk 
aversion among low-skilled individuals make migration abroad relatively less attractive 
for this group.  Finally, a “Washington apples” effect (Alchian and Allen, 1964) may also 
contribute to positive selection of migrants.  Given long queues for U.S. legal admission, 
two-thirds of Mexican-born individuals entering the country appear to do so illegally on 
their first attempt.  Enforcement against illegal immigrants may act as a head tax, 
disproportionately penalizing the less skilled.  If more-skilled and less-skilled illegal 
immigrants compete for jobs in the United States, it will be efficient, given fixed 
migration costs, to fill jobs with more skilled individuals first. While it is plausible that 
more-educated individuals face lower migration costs, we are unaware of data that would 
allow us to test this idea.  We leave this for future research.   36
Appendix 
 
This appendix reinterprets the model in the text in terms of Roy (1951).   
Residents of Mexico face a wage distribution in country i=0 (Mexico), 1 (U.S.) given by 
  i i i i s ) w ln( ε δ µ + + =     ( A 1 )  
where wi is the wage in country i, µ i is the zero-schooling mean wage in i, s is the level of 
schooling, δ i is the return to schooling in i, and ε i captures deviations from mean earnings 
(e.g., returns to unmeasured ability) in i and has distribution N(0, 2
i σ ).  ε 0 and ε 1 have 
correlation coefficient ρ 01>0 (employers in both countries value similar characteristics).  
Schooling is a random variable with distribution  
  s s s ε µ + =        ( A 2 )  
where µ s is mean schooling and ε s ~ N(0,
2
s σ ). 
Combining (A1)-(A2), a resident of Mexico will migrate to the United States if  
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ln( 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0
1 > − + − + − + − − ≈
+
δ δ ε ε ε δ δ µ π µ µ s s C w
w
 (A3) 
where C is migration costs and π =C/w0 is time-equivalent migration costs.  Redefining π 
slightly relative to the model presented in the text, we assume that time-equivalent 
migration costs are a random variable with distribution 
  π π ε µ π + =        ( A 4 )  
where µ π  denotes mean migration costs and ε π  ~ N(0, 2
π σ ), as in Borjas (1991).  The 
correlation coefficient for ε π  and ε i is ρ iπ , i=0,1,s.  By (A4), the probability that an 
individual migrates to the United States is given by 
    ) ( 1 )]) ( [ Pr( 0 1 0 1 z v s Φ − = − + − − − > δ δ µ µ µ µ π    (A5) 
where Φ (z) is the standard normal distribution function, v = (ε 1-ε 0 - ε π  )+ε s(δ 1-δ 0) and z = 
-[µ 1-µ 0-µ π +µ s(δ 1-δ 0)]/σ v.  The probability above gives the Mexico-to-U.S. migration rate. 
Will migrants from Mexico to the United States tend to be individuals with 
relatively high or low education levels?  Given (A1)-(A5) and letting  v v v σ / = ′ , the 
expected level of schooling for a Mexican migrant in the United States is 























− − + = > ′ + = > ′  (A6) 
where λ (z) denotes the inverse Mills ratio φ (z)/[1-Φ (z)], with φ (z) being the standard 
normal density function. Migrants from Mexico will have above (below) average 
schooling relative to residents of Mexico if the term in the brackets on the right of (A6) is 
positive (negative).  Given (δ 1-δ 0)<0, migrants will have below-average schooling if ρ sπ , 
the correlation between schooling and time-equivalent migration costs, is not too 
negative, and above-average schooling if ρ sπ  is negative and large in absolute value 
relative to |δ 1-δ 0|.  While we cannot sign the term in brackets in (A6), evidence presented 
in the text suggests that there is a plausible case to be made for ρ sπ  being negative and so 
for migrants having above-average education levels.  Positive selection of migrants is 
more likely the stronger is the negative correlation between observable skill and 
migration costs and the smaller are the excess returns to education in the source country.    37
By conditioning wages on observable correlates of skill, the analysis above can be 
extended to account for self-selection in terms of unobservable skills. The implications 
are similar to those of the model described above. In particular, if earnings dispersion is 
wider in Mexico than in the United States, as it is apparently the case, this would tend to 
cause migrants to be negatively selected in terms of unobservable skills.  However, 
positive selection emerges if individuals with higher unobserved skills have lower time-
equivalent migration costs and this correlation is sufficiently strong. 
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Table 1:  Share of U.S. Immigrants from Mexico in Population of Mexico, 1990 
(percent) 
 
    All Mexican Immigrants        Arrivals 1981-1990         Arrivals 1986-1990 
Age  Males Females Males Females Males Females 
          
16-24  7.53 4.88 5.79 3.32 3.92 2.26 
        
25-34  12.02  8.18 6.46 4.27 2.92 2.10 
        
35-44  10.17  8.16 2.55 2.02 1.21 0.90 
        
45-54  7.57 6.99 1.56 1.40 0.79 0.70 
        
55-65  5.96 6.11 0.83 1.06 0.44 0.56 
 
Notes:  This table shows Mexican immigrants in the United States (either all immigrants 
or immigrants that arrived during the period 1981-1990) as a percentage of the 1990 
population of Mexico by age and sex categories.   41
Table 2a:  Summary Statistics for Males, 1990 
 
                      U.S. Residents    
    Mexico    Recent Mex.  All Mex.  Other  U.S. 
Variable     Residents   Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants Natives 
Age   32.7    29.3  35.0  40.5  37.2 
              
Highest Grade  0  11.6    11.9  12.8  3.8  0.6 
of Schooling  1 to 4  19.1    10.7  14.6  2.7  0.5 
Completed  5 to 8  28.6    29.0  30.9  9.2  3.9 
(%) 9  13.9    9.4  7.9  2.9  3.3 
  10 to 11  7.7    7.2  6.1  4.7  10.7 
 <12  81.1    68.2  72.3  23.2  19.0 
 12  6.5    19.9  17.0  24.1  32.4 
  13 to 15  4.7    8.5  7.8  21.5  27.7 
 16+  7.7    3.5  2.9  31.2  20.9 
              
Wage Earners (%)   66.1    83.0  83.7  78.6  80.9 
Hourly wage    1.45    6.95  8.12  13.92  14.18 
(standard dev.)    (2.5)    (5.73)  (6.6)  (12.0)  (12.3) 
              
N     211,133    36,119  66,660  189,237  708,727 
 
Notes:  The sample is all individuals 16-65 years old.  Residents of Mexico are a 1% 
random sample of the XII Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda, 1990; Mexican and 
other immigrants are drawn from the 1990 5% U.S. PUMS; and U.S. natives are drawn 
from the 1990 1% U.S. PUMS.  Immigrants in the United States are restricted to be 
individuals 17 years or older at time of entry into the country.  Recent immigrants from 
Mexico are individuals who entered the United States during the period 1981-1990.   
Schooling variables show the percentage of individuals whose high grade completed is 
that indicated and wage earners shows the percentage of individuals with positive labor 
earnings in 1990.  Wage levels are in 1990 U.S. dollars.  Average wages in Mexico are 
for those individuals with average hourly earnings greater than $0.1 and less than $20 and 
in the United States are for those individuals with average hourly earnings greater that $1 
and less than $100.  The sample size is all individuals (not just those with valid wages).   42
Table 2b:  Summary Statistics for Females, 1990 
 
                      U.S. Residents    
    Mexico    Recent Mex.  All Mex.  Other  U.S. 
      Residents   Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants Natives 
Age   32.7    31.0  37.1  41.9  37.7 
              
Highest Grade  0  15.6    12.3  12.8  4.4  0.5 
of Schooling  1 to 4  19.6    12.0  14.6  3.3  0.3 
Completed  5 to 8  28.1    30.0  32.6  10.2  3.1 
(%) 9  12.3    8.5  7.3  3.1  2.9 
  10 to 11  7.4    6.1  5.3  4.9  10.5 
 <12  83.3    68.9  72.6  25.8  17.2 
 12  7.6    19.5  17.3  30.3  35.6 
  13 to 15  4.5    8.2  7.5  22.2  29.6 
 16+  4.6    3.4  2.6  21.7  17.5 
              
Wage Earners (%)   20.7    44.7  48.2  60.5  70.3 
Hourly wage    1.33    6.05  6.62  10.15  9.47 
(standard dev.)    (2.1)    (5.38)  (5.8)  (8.4)  (7.4) 
              
N     228,964    26,643  51,918  213,020  737,267 
 
Notes:  See notes to Table 2a.   43
Table 3:  Educational Attainment for Mexico-Born 25-34 Year Olds, 1990 
        
    Mexico Recent  Mex. Mexico Recent  Mex. 
    Residents Immigrants Residents Immigrants 
      Males  Males  Females  Females 
 
Age   29.1 28.8 29.2 28.5 
        
Highest Grade  0  7.8  10.7  10.9  10.2 
of Schooling  1 to 4  16.0  9.7  18.5  10.2 
Completed  5 to 8  29.2  29.3  30.2  31.7 
(%)  9  13.4 8.6 11.4 8.7 
  10 to 11  6.0  6.6  5.5  5.6 
  <12  72.5 64.9 76.8 66.3 
  12  8.4 20.7 9.1 19.6 
  13 to 15  6.4  10.1  6.2  9.6 
 16+  12.7  4.2 7.9 4.5 
        
N      61,018 12,317 55,436 16,713 
 
Notes:  This table shows the fraction of 25-34 year-old individuals who have completed 
given levels of schooling for residents of Mexico and recent Mexican immigrants in the 
United States (individuals who arrived during the period 1981-1990).  See notes to Table 
2a for more details on the sample. 
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Table 4a:  Labor-Force Participation Rates, Males in 1990 
 
             Residents of Mexico            Recent U.S. Immigrants from Mexico 
Years of       Age Category            Age Category   
Schooling 16-24  25-34  35-44 45-54 55-65  16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-65
              
0  63.0 72.5 73.9 71.8 62.5  76.2 85.4 85.9 84.4 71.3 
1  to  4  70.9 80.4 80.8 76.6 64.7  80.5 89.0 89.3 84.3 73.8 
5  to  8  66.3 82.7 84.2 79.8 61.8  83.1 89.9 88.8 86.8 72.5 
9  62.3 85.7 85.9 80.5 61.6  80.8 89.1 89.7 83.4 69.8 
10  to  11 31.1 86.6 88.8 79.4 63.5  79.2 89.5 87.6 83.9 75.8 
12  52.5 85.2 88.8 83.9 62.0  82.7 90.2 90.3 88.4 72.1 
13  to  15 32.5 82.4 90.3 84.5 64.0  83.3 91.6 91.4 84.6 81.0 
16+  51.4 84.4 91.6 87.1 69.2  77.6 89.7 93.6 88.3 89.7 
 
Notes:  This table shows the percentage of the population that reported positive labor 
earnings in 1990 by age category and by highest year of schooling completed for 
residents of Mexico and for recent Mexican immigrants in the United States (individuals 
who arrived in the country during the period 1981-1990).  Immigrants are individuals 
aged 17 years or older at time of entry in the United States. 
 
 
Table 4b:  Labor-Force Participation Rates, Females in 1990 
 
             Residents of Mexico            Recent U.S. Immigrants from Mexico 
Years of       Age Category            Age Category   
Schooling 16-24  25-34  35-44 45-54 55-65  16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-65
              
0  9.7  9.1  9.8  9.1  7.3  34.8 41.6 48.8 39.5 15.4 
1  to  4  13.3 10.6 11.5  9.9  7.4  33.2 46.5 54.3 45.6 25.5 
5  to  8  18.7 16.3 19.3 16.8 10.5  38.5 48.7 52.5 48.7 29.2 
9  27.5 27.4 30.2 26.9 12.1  40.5 50.0 55.1 54.5 37.6 
10  to  11 17.9 35.4 40.1 34.8 16.9  40.4 48.5 50.3 63.0 38.3 
12  37.2 47.1 48.1 42.0 22.5  46.9 52.1 57.9 50.2 27.4 
13  to  15 27.3 55.2 57.6 51.0 27.3  49.8 55.4 58.0 60.7 41.6 
16+  47.8 58.9 61.5 54.5 32.9  41.7 55.0 65.1 54.9 34.4 
 
Notes:  See notes to Table 4a.   45
Table 5a:  OLS Wage Regressions for Men, 1990 
 
    Mexican    Mexican Immigrants  Other  U.S. 
Variable     Residents  Recent  All  Immigrants Natives 
Constant   -1.748  1.228  1.033  0.959    0.198 
   (0.039)  (0.080)  (0.057)  (0.034)  (0.021) 
        
High  1 to 4  0.123                  
Grade    (0.009)                  
Completed  5 to 8  0.267  0.041  0.068  0.028   0.051 
   (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
 9  0.420  0.101  0.142  0.043    0.143 
   (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
  10 to 11  0.547  0.052  0.124  0.106   0.184 
   (0.014)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
 12  0.662  0.124  0.182  0.183    0.328 
   (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.015) 
  13 to 15  0.857  0.198  0.266  0.307   0.438 
   (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.015) 
 16+  1.133  0.391  0.471  0.637    0.716 
   (0.011)  (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.016) 
            
Age   0.044  0.015  0.021  0.044    0.068 
   (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Age
2/100   -0.045  -0.017  -0.027  -0.048    -0.066 
   (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
       
Imm. 1981-84    0.122  0.123  0.094     
Cohort     (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.005)   
 1975-80      0.256  0.212     
       (0.009)  (0.006)   
 1971-74      0.349  0.321     
       (0.011)  (0.007)   
 1965-70      0.430  0.395     
       (0.015)  (0.008)   
  pre 1965      0.503  0.473    
       (0.017)  (0.008)   
R Sqd.    0.235  0.045  0.112  0.244  0.213 
N     98,139 19,940 42,514  134,403  450,756   46
Table 5b:  OLS Wage Regressions for Women, 1990 
 
    Mexican    Mexican Immigrants  Other  U.S. 
Variable     Residents Recent All  Immigrants  Natives 
Constant    -1.684  1.350  1.213  1.328   0.835  
    (0.069) (0.130) (0.083) (0.036) (0.025) 
        
High  1 to 4  0.092                  
Grade    (0.019)                  
  5 to 8  0.217  0.002  0.030  0.011   -0.019  
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.021) 
  9  0.459  0.046  0.080  0.026   0.002  
    (0.020) (0.026) (0.017) (0.013) (0.022) 
  10 to 11  0.615  0.039  0.084  0.057   0.041~  
    (0.023) (0.030) (0.022) (0.012) (0.020) 
  12  0.758  0.111  0.154  0.146   0.214  
    (0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.008) (0.020) 
  13 to 15  0.906  0.176  0.253  0.338   0.396  
    (0.020) (0.027) (0.017) (0.009) (0.020) 
  16+  1.078  0.355  0.446  0.625   0.736  
    (0.019) (0.039) (0.031) (0.009) (0.020) 
        
Age    0.043  0.002  0.008  0.013   0.034  
    (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age
2/100    -0.044  0.000  -0.009  -0.016   -0.033  
    (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
       
Imm. 1981-84    0.060  0.064  0.113     
Cohort    (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.006)  
 1975-80      0.146  0.221     
      (0.014)  (0.007)   
 1971-74      0.216  0.282     
      (0.016)  (0.007)   
 1965-70      0.245  0.319     
      (0.020)  (0.008)   
  pre 1965      0.272  0.335    
      (0.023)  (0.008)   
R  Sqd.    0.230 0.032 0.061 0.182 0.176 
N     29,193 8,689 20,560  117,187  404,792   47
Notes to Table 5: 
 
Reported coefficients are for OLS regressions using the log average hourly wage as the 
dependent variable.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.   
The samples are individuals 25-65 years of age who are residents of Mexico (column 1), 
Mexican immigrants in the United States who arrived during the period 1981-1990 
(column 2), all Mexican immigrants in the United States (column 3), other (non-Mexico-
born) immigrants in the United States (column 4), or native-born U.S. residents (column 
5).  Immigrant samples exclude individuals aged 16 years or less at time of entry in the 
United States.  The Mexican-resident sample excludes individuals with hourly wages less 
than $0.10 or greater than $20 and U.S.-resident samples exclude individuals with hourly 
wages less than $1 or greater than $100 (monetary units are 1990 dollars).  Additional 
regressors (not shown) are dummy variables for marital status and residence in a 
metropolitan area (all columns), dummy variables for race (columns 4 and 5), and 
dummy variables for year of entry in the United States (columns 2-4). 
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Table 6:   
Predicted Wages for Mexican Immigrants and Wage Quintiles in Mexico 
 
      % of Mex. Immigrants with Predicted Wages in Quintile
                     Men                  Women 
Wage Quintile for  All  Recent  All  Recent 
Residents of Mexico    Immigrants  Immigrants  Immigrants  Immigrants 
1  18.6 19.1 19.3 23.1 
      
2  17.2 17.8 29.6 28.5 
      
3  21.8 20.2 20.3 19.0 
      
4  23.2 26.4 17.5 19.2 
      
5      19.2 16.5 13.3 10.2 
 
This table shows how Mexican immigrants in the United States would be distributed 
across wage quintiles for residents of Mexico, where the quintiles go from lowest to 
highest earnings.  Quintiles are constructed using an OLS wage equation estimated on 
residents of Mexico to predict within sample wages.  The same OLS wage equation is 
then used to predict wages for Mexican immigrants in the United States.  See the text for 
details on the estimation. 
 
 
Table 7:  Distribution of the Mexican Migration Project Sample by Schooling 
 
 Migrants    Non-migrants 
Schooling (%)     
0-1 years  27.1  23.3 
2-4 years  32.6  22.1 
5-6 years  23.1  22.5 
7-9 years  8.9  11.7 
10-12 years  4.3  8.1 
13 or more years  4.1  12.3 
    
% of trips to U.S. in- 





      
 
Notes: This table is reproduced from Orrenius (1999). The sample consists of head of 
household males between 15 and 65 years of age, surveyed between 1987-1995 in 35 
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Figure 3a:  U.S. and Mexico Wage Distributions 1990, Males 
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Figure 3b:  U.S. and Mexico Wage Distributions 1990, Females 
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Figure 4:  Predicted U.S.-Mexico Hourly Wage Differentials, 1990 
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Figure 5:  Predicted Probability of Migration, 1990 
 
Age
 Grade 0, males  Grade 1-4, males
 Grade 5-8, males  Grade 9, males










 Grade 10-11, males  Grade 12, males
 Grade 13-15, males  Grade 16+, males










 Grade 0, females  Grade 1-4, females
 Grade 5-8, females  Grade 9, females








 Grade 10-11, females  Grade 12, females
 Grade 13-15, females  Grade 16+, females







   53
Figure 6a: Counterfactual Wage Densities for Mexican Immigrant Males, 1990 
(Based on skill prices in Mexico) 
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Figure 6b: Counterfactual Wage Densities for Mexican Immigrant Females, 1990 
(Based on skill prices in Mexico) 
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Figure 7a: Counterfactual Wage Densities for Mexican Immigrant Males, 1990 
(Correcting for Undercounted Illegal Immigrants)  
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Figure 7b: Counterfactual Wage Densities for Mexican Immigrant Females, 1990 
(Correcting for Undercounted Illegal Immigrants) 
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Figure 8a: Counterfactual Wage Densities for Mexican Resident Males, 1990 
(Based on U.S. skill prices) 
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Figure 8b: Counterfactual Wage Densities for Mexican Resident Females, 1990 
(Based on U.S. skill prices)  
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